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In recent years, epistemologists have witnessed the re-emergence of the modern episte-
mological project of amelioration, sometimes known as an exercise in “regulative” epistemology. 
There is a growing debate of many exciting themes. For instance, virtue and vice epistemology 
have forced us to think about themes that are not so closely related to the attempts of explaining 
what knowledge is or of vindicating knowledge’s possession in the face of skeptical challenges.
In the face of this facts, it is such a pleasure to recommend Intellectual Virtues and Educa-
tion. Edited by Jason Baehr, this collection of essays addresses the theme of teaching intellectual 
virtues and, as far as I know, it is the first book to systematically address such theme. The main 
idea behind the project seems to be that educational theory and practice can be benefited by 
the adoption of a virtue terminology. Moreover, there is this optimistic hope that we can advise 
school and academic practices in a way that can be conducive to the cultivation of intellectual 
virtues. As we can expect, this cannot be the work solely of philosophers, but it requires the 





INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN APPLIED VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
Each part of the book tries to answer different questions related to the teaching of intel-
lectual virtues and each one concentrates four essays. The first division of the book is dedicated 
to specify which intellectual virtues are central to education. There, contributions were made by 
Wayne D. Riggs, Lani Watson, Ian James Kidd, and Allan Hazlett. The second division of the 
book is devoted to describe the relations of intellectual virtues and other educational aims and 
practices. This part of the book receives the contributions from Harvey Siegel, Duncan Prit-
chard, Emily Robertson, and Ben Kotzee. The final division of the book is dedicated to answer 
the question about how intellectual virtues can be fostered in the classroom. Its contributors are 
Heather Battaly, Robert C. Roberts, Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King, and Steven L. Porter.
In the concluding remarks of the work, Baehr notes that there are some common, shared 
features that are endorsed in many essays as components of an intellectual virtue, namely, an 
ability component, a motivational component, an affective component, and a judgment (or 
prudential) component. These components might be worthy of note in the educational context 
because it can be the case that different components of an intellectual virtue will demand diffe-
rent didactic methods to progress in its inculcation. In this review, I will argue that some of the 
essays in the collection highlight two more components of an intellectual virtue that helps us to 
think about some issues of teaching intellectual virtues.
Let me start with the ability component. Such component refers to the proficiency pe-
culiar to each intellectual virtue. In fact, as Baehr noted, this component provides us tools for 
individuating intellectual virtues. For instance, in her contribution, Lani Watson has argued that 
to be an inquisitive person in a way characteristically virtuous from an intellectual point of view, 
one needs a proficiency to formulate good questions. This also provides us tools for discrimi-
nating, as Harvey Siegel does in his contribution, between abilities and mere dispositions. For 
instance, I can be an inquisitive person without being inquisitive in a way characteristically 
virtuous from an intellectual point of view. This is so because, as Watson has argued, a mere in-
quisitive person is a person that is characteristically disposed (or motivated) to sincerely engage 
with the act of questioning1, without necessarily making good questions.
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Baehr, I think, does not note, but the classification of intellectual virtues he argued for in 
his monograph, The Inquiring Mind (2011), is an enormous contribution, not only to our in-
quiries on the nature and structure of intellectual virtues, as corroborated by Watson’s inquiries 
on the virtue of inquisitiveness, but also to the question, competently treated by Ben Kotzee, 
of how we can measure the learning of intellectual virtues. I explain. First, most of the essays 
not only corroborates the adequacy of Baehrian taxonomy of intellectual virtues (e.g., Watson’s 
contribution), but also potentially extends Baehrian taxonomy (e.g., Kidd’s discussion about 
the virtue of intellectual humility and Robertson’s identification and description of the testi-
monial virtue).
In his debate about the virtue of intellectual humility, Ian James Kidd emphasized intel-
lectual humility as a virtue that calibrates our confidence in ourselves. Intellectual humility, as I 
see it, is the proficiency to recognize our own cognitive limitations, including the possibility of 
error and our epistemic dependence. In Baehr’s taxonomy, it is an intellectual virtue grouped as 
a virtue of cognitive integrity, since it contributes to people do not be corrupted in the process 
of inquiry by the deleterious tendencies of human mind, such as self-deception2. But if we took 
Kidd’s contribution as a reference, we have reasons to also group intellectual humility as a virtue 
of appropriate confidence and deference. This group is not part of the initial Baehrian taxonomy, 
but it may be argued that we need it too. Here is one reason. In its initial classification, Baehr 
laid aside virtues like intellectual autonomy, sobriety, and discipline. Autonomy and sobriety, 
at least, are required to appropriately trust in ourselves or to defer appropriately – to not take 
enthusiastically ideas for which we do not have evidence in support (intellectual sobriety) or to 
not be inappropriately influenced by others (intellectual autonomy).
Here is another reason. Emily Robertson’s contribution shows us an intellectual virtue 
not commonly described, namely, testimonial virtue. In many passages, she emphasized the clo-
se relation between testimonial virtue and appropriate deference. After all, in Robertson’s words, 
persons who possess testimonial virtue have a cultivated disposition to exercise due caution in 
2 I will not discuss this here, but I think it is plausible to replace the name of such group for virtues of 
transparency, since cognitive integrity is a particular intellectual virtue of such group, maybe a supervenient 
one, while “transparency” is a more technical term in epistemological debates involving self--knowledge (see, 





receiving testimony and a trained (but reflectively revisable) sensibility for whom is to be trusted 
in what circumstances backed by relevant knowledge for making that judgment3.
All this reveal that there is a success component of intellectual virtues, but that this suc-
cess component is not (necessarily) tied to cognitive achievements and epistemic goods as tra-
ditionally endorsed, but to the different demands and challenges we face in our cognitive life, 
particularly in the school and academic lives – our focus here. Moreover, if, on the one hand, 
the ability component of an intellectual virtue gives us a tool for individuate intellectual virtues, 
on the other hand, the success component of an intellectual virtue gives us a tool for generalize 
intellectual virtues, grouping them according to their contributions to particular demands we 
face in the cognitive life. Such generalization should serve as the basis for a taxonomy of intel-
lectual virtues.
In addition, Baehrian taxonomy seems to be very useful in the specific contexts of school 
and academic life, not only because the cognitive demands described by it are common demands 
that we face in these contexts, but also because, with this groups in mind, we can operationalize 
intellectual virtues in a way that can be useful to measure student’s growth in intellectual vir-
tues. Consider, for instance, three groups: (a) mental flexibility; (b) appropriate confidence and 
deference; and (c) consistency in evaluation4. The groups (a) and (c) are present in Baehr’s initial 
classification. The group (b), however, is my own addition giving the reasons above5.
Psychological literature provides us many creative examples of how to measure each one 
of this groups. For instance, Duncker’s candle task and Asch’s conformity experiments can me-
asure, respectively, virtues of the group of mental flexibility, such as open-mindedness, inven-
tiveness, flexibility, agility, and adaptability, and virtues of the group of appropriate confiden-
ce and deference, such as intellectual autonomy, intellectual courage, and testimonial virtue. 
3 See p. 130.
4 Here, again, I think it is perfectly plausible to replace the name of such group for virtues of correction in 
evaluation, since consistency is a particular intellectual virtue of such group and, also, because the challenge 
that the virtues of such group contribute for us to resolve, such as objectivity, impartiality, and intellectual jus-
tice, is to correct our judgments. Consistency is only one way to make such correction.
5 I would add a group of virtues related to organization in the studies, such as intellectual discipline, but I 
do not have space to discuss this here.





 Of course, the adequacy of these measurements can be limited, but so are the proposals discus-
sed by Ben Kotzee in his contribution.
Recently, a psychological research led by Dan M. Kahan have shown that subjects hi-
ghest in numeracy tend to use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conform their 
interpretation of the data to the result most consistent with their political outlooks6. The tasks 
elaborated by Kahan and his team can be useful to measure virtues of the group of correction in 
evaluation, such as fair-mindedness, consistency, objectivity, impartiality, and open-mindedness.
Now, someone may doubt that this can be the case because – it can be argued – the 
present propose can not measure important components of an intellectual virtue, such as the 
motivational and affective components. I agree with it, but I think it is still useful to measure the 
learning of intellectual virtues. For instance, if it is right to say that an inquisitive person tends to 
be more motivated to learn, then we can expect that if our adopted didactic methods are effica-
cious in inculcating virtuous like inquisitiveness, then students will be more motivated to learn.
Lani Watson discussion about inquisitiveness also highlight another important compo-
nent of an intellectual virtue. She calls attention to the fact that inquisitiveness can only be 
cultivated under the repeated exercise of a particular epistemic practice – namely, questioning. 
However, if we think about other intellectual virtues, we realize that there are virtues that can 
be cultivated under the repeated exercise of more than one epistemic practice. For instance, 
intellectual autonomy can be exercised by interpreting a text, reasoning about some issue, ob-
serving some phenomenon, and by questioning too. Giving this, I think we can expect that 
some students can manifest the proficiency proper to intellectual autonomy in some epistemic 
practice – let me say, reasoning – without being intellectually autonomous in many other epis-
temic practices – let me say, interpretation. If this is the case, it can be explained by the fact that, 
in the specific case of the student at issue, the proficiency proper to intellectual autonomy has 
a limited set of epistemic practices in its etiology, which can be fixed by giving to this student 
opportunities to exercise intellectual autonomy in other situations. Here, I am highlighting an 
etiological component of intellectual virtues. Such component would be useful to diagnose 
possible deficiencies, by a pupil, in learning an intellectual virtue.
6 See Kahan et al. (2017).





There is much more to be said about such immeasurable contributions to the project of 
educating for intellectual virtues, but this is more than I can write here, in a book review. In 
conclusion, I praise such a formidable effort to put education and virtue epistemology in what 
seems to me the right path.
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